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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF U T A H 
Case No, 
13731 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was originally brought by Clyde E. Har-
vey (not a party to these proceedings) to foreclose a real 
estate contract which Plaintiff had elected to treat as a 
note and mortgage. The property in question was pur-
chased at sheriff's sale by one of the Defendants against 
whom the action was originally brought. Subsequently, 
the property was sold to Respondent. The particular third-
party action now before this Court was initiated several 
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years later by Appellants who now assert an interest in the 
property and seek to have Respondent's deed declared void. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After reviewing the entire record, including the rec-
ord and documents from prior proceedings involving 
Appellants, the lower court concluded to treat the Motion 
to Dismiss as one for summary judgment and afforded 
both parties an opportunity to present further evidence in 
support of or opposed to such motion. Thereafter, on hear-
ing, the court granted summary judgment dismissing 
Appellants' Third-Party Complaint with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the summary judgment dis-
missing Appellants' Third-Party Complaint affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent believes that Appellants' statement of the 
facts is insufficient and therefore adds the following: 
Intermountain Capital Corporation herein referred to 
as Intermountain acquired an interest in the property by 
an assignment from Beehive Investment of buyer's interest 
in Contract "A" referred to in Appellants' brief and the 
seller's interest in Contract "B", covering the same prop-
erty. (R. 45-48, 65-68) 
Thereafter, Appellants, who were the buyers under 
Contract "B," failed to make payments due Intermountain 
according to the terms of Contract "B." As a result of 
2 
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Appellants' default under Contract "B", payments under 
Contract "A" became delinquent. The sellers under Con-
tract "A" elected to treat that contract as a note and 
mortgage and sued to foreclose. 
The original Complaint was filed on March 25, 1968. 
(R. 1-15) Thereafter, on April 23, 1968, Intermountain 
filed its Answer and cross claimed against Appellants, 
also Defendants in that action, seeking a determination: 
(R. 31-32) 
1. That Appellants had pledged their interest in the 
subject property to Intermountain as security on a loan. 
2. That the loan upon which the security assignment 
was given was in default. 
3. That Intermountain was therefore entitled to any 
interest Appellants had in the subject property. 
4. That Appellants were further indebted to Inter-
mountain in the sum of $34,139.00, plus interest, by 
reason of Contract "B" referred to in Plaintiff's Com-
plaint, which contract concerns the property which is 
the subject of this action. 
5. That Appellants were then in default on Con-
tract "B" for which Intermountain had given appro-
priate notice. 
6. That Intermountain be released from all obliga-
tions to convey the subject property to Appellants. 
7. That all payments made by Appellants be for-
feited to Intermountain as liquidated damages. 
3 
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8. That Appellants be ordered to pay the sum of 
$25,841.76 by reason of the default on the aforemen-
tioned loan. 
9. That the subject property pledged to secure said 
loan be forfeited. 
Appellants answered the Cross Complaint of Inter-
mountain and admitted that their interest in the property in 
question was given as security but denied that the loan for 
which it was pledged was in default. (R. 34-35) Appel-
lants further alleged that Intermountain had committed 
anticipatory breach of Contract "B" and prayed that Inter-
mountain recover nothing by its Cross Complaint and that 
the same be dismissed with prejudice. (R. 36) 
In May, 1968, Intermountain filed a Motion request-
ing the court to order Appellants to amend their Answer 
to Intermountain's Cross Complaint to make it more defi-
nite in that it sounded in counterclaim but failed to pray 
for any relief. (R. 39-40) 
Appellants subsequently filed a Cross Claim against 
Intermountain in August of 1968 in which they prayed 
for damages as follows: (R. 73-75) 
1. $50,000.00 for loss of the amount invested by 
Appellants in the subject property. 
2. $100,000.00 for loss of reasonably anticipated 
profits. 
3. $4,000.00 in attorneys fees, plus costs of action. 
The Cross Claim failed to assert any interest in or claim 
to the real property but sought only a money judgment. 
4 
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The aforementioned Cross Complaint and Cross 
Claim were never litigated as part of rhe origin;*I lore-
closure action. 
mountain at sheriff's sale under a Decree of Foreclosure 
which was entered in fu\<u of uu? Har\e>^ or- juK \ 
1968. This Decree protected the right of redemption to 
all persons having an interest in the subject premises, as 
follows: (R. 61) 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that the persons, having an inter-
est in the subject premises shall have the right, 
upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to 
redeem the same within the time provided by law 
for such redemption; that from and after the ex-
piration of the period of redemption as provided 
by law, the defendants above named, and each of 
them, and all persons claiming by, through or 
under them, or any of them, be forever barred and 
foreclosed of all right, title and interest in and 
to the subject premises and that from and after the 
delivery of the Sheriff's Deed to the subject prem-
ises that the purchaser named therein be given 
possession thereof. 
Upon proof of interest therein, Appellants could have 
redeemed the premises within the time provided by law 
for such redemption. No right of redemption was there-
after claimed or atempted by Appellants, and the period 
for redemption expired on February 6, 1969. 
In February, 1974, more than five years and six 
months after the Decree of Foreclosure was entered (R. 
59) and more than four and one half years after the prop-
5 
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erty had been conveyed by Intermountain to Respondent 
(R. 101), Appellants, without notice to Respondent, ob-
tained an order permitting a third-party complaint to be 
filed with Respondent added as a third party defendant. 
(R. 90-92) In their Third-Party Complaint, Appellants 
prayed that the Cross Complaint of Intermountain be dis-
missed; that judgment as prayed in the Cross Claim previ-
ously filed be awarded to Appellants; that Intermountain 
be ordered to convey title to the subject property and that 
the Warranty Deed from Intermountain to Respondent be 
declared null and void. (R. 92) 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party 
Complaint came on for hearing on May 1, 1974, at which 
time the parties referred the court to the prior proceed-
ings which appeared in the record, whereupon the court 
determined that if matters outside the immediate pleadings 
were to be considered, it would treat the Motion to Dis-
miss as one for summary judgment. The court at that 
time gave the parties two weeks in which to present any 
additional matter pertinent to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. (R. 122) 
Thereafter, on further hearing before the court, Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment as to Appellants' Third-Party 
Complaint was granted in favor of Respondent on May 
15, 1974. (R. 139) ; vi » 
Also, in May, 1974, Appellants filed an Amended 
Cross Claim against Intermountain in which they prayed 
for the following relief. (R. 131) 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. On their first cause of action, $200,000.00 
damages and $10,000.00 attorneys fees. 
2. On their second cause of action for $150,000.00 
damages and $4,000.00 attorneys fees. 
3. On their third cause of action for a judgment de-
claring that Intermountain has forfeited the entire inter-
est reserved in the promissory note and its amendments 
and for three times the amount of interest paid on said 
note and amendments, plus a reasonable attorneys fee. 
Appellants did not file their Lis Pendens which they 
claim was intended to give notice of the pending cross 
claim against Intermountain until July 30, 1969, 16 days 
after the property in question had already been conveyed 
by warranty deed to Respondent. (R. 101) 
ISSUES 
The sole issue insofar as Respondent is concerned is 
whether the court erred in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Respondent. However, this issue will be treated 
under the following points: 
1. By electing to treat Intermountain Capital 
Corporation as having committed anticipatory 
breach of Contract "B" and by suing for 
damages, appellants are now estopped from 
coming into court and claiming an interest 
in the subject property. 
2. The fact that Intermountain Capital Corpo-
ration purchased the property in question at 
the sheriff's sale is of no significance in de-
termining the rights of the parties herein be-
cause appellants had already elected their 
remedy and did not in substance or effect alter 
that election subsequent to the sale. 
7 
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The lower court had before it and considered 
all of the prior proceedings concerning the 
property in question and it was not error to 
treat Respondent's Motion to Dismiss as a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and to grant 
the same. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY ELECTING TO TREAT INTERMOUN-
TAIN CAPITAL C O R P O R A T I O N AS 
HAVING COMMITTED ANTICIPATORY 
BREACH OF CONTRACT "B" AND BY SU-
ING FOR DAMAGES, APPELLANTS ARE 
NOW ESTOPPED FROM COMING INTO 
COURT AND CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Appellants alleged in their Answer to Plaintiff's Com-
plaint filed in May of 1968 that Intermountain Capital 
Corporation had committed anticipatory breach of Con-
tract "B" with Appellants and thereby had excused Ap-
pellants from performance on the contract. (R. 36) 
Also, in their Third-Party Complaint against Re-
spondent filed in February, 1974, Appellants allege that 
Intermountain had committed anticipatory breach of 
Contract "B" by jeopardizing title to the property in ques-
tion and by causing a foreclosure action to be commenced. 
<R. 98) 
This Court held in the case of Hurwitz v. David K. 
Richard's Company, 20 Utah 2d232,436P.2d794 (1968), 
8 
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that where anticipatory breach of contract is alleged, the 
party so alleging has the following options available to 
him: 
1. Treat the entire contract as broken and sue for 
damages. 
2. Treat the contract as still binding and wait until 
the time arrived for its performance and at such time bring 
an action on the contract. 
3. Rescind the contract and sue for money paid or 
for the value of the service or property furnished. 
See, also, 17 AM. JUR. 2d, Contracts, §449. 
It is clear from the record of the prior proceedings 
involving Appellants that Appellants elected the first of 
the above enumerated options and by so doing are now 
estopped from changing their minds to claim an interest in 
the subject property and to seek to have the deed to Re-
spondent declared null and void. 
In their Cross Claim against Intermountain in August 
of 1968, the Appellants prayed for $50,000.00 damages 
for the loss of amount invested in the property, $100,000.00 
for loss of reasonably anticipated profits from the prop-
erty, plus $4,000.00 attorneys fees. (R. 75) Subsequently, 
in February, 1974, when Appellants filed their Third-
Party Complaint against Respondent, they reaffirmed that 
position by asking judgment as prayed in their Cross 
Claim against Intermountain. (R. 92, 99) 
Consistent with their election to sue for damages, 
Appellants filed an Amended Cross Claim against Inter-
mountain in May of 1974 in which they prayed for the 
following relief: (R. 131) 
9 
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L Under their first cause of action, $200,000.00 
damages and $10,000.00 attorneys fees. 
2. Under their second cause of action for $150,000.00 
damages and $4,000.00 attorneys fees. 
In choosing his remedy, a purchaser must elect either 
to affirm or disaffirm or rescind the contract. He cannot 
affirm the contract in part and rescind it in part. Section 
543b, Contracts, 92 C.J.S., states the law thusly: 
". . . {T}he purchaser in choosing his remedy, 
must elect either to affirm or disaffirm or rescind 
the contract. If he chooses to affirm the contract, 
he may either bring an action in equity for its spe-
cific performance and incidental damages, or he 
may sue the vendor for damages, or he may accept 
such performance as the vendor is able to give and 
subject the question of damages to arbitration, or 
compromise the difference. If the purchaser elects 
to disaffirm or rescind the contract, he may bring 
an action to recover the purchase price already 
paid, or he may sue for rescission of the contract 
and to recover the amount paid thereon. The pur-
chaser may also elect to treat the vendor's breach 
or default as a discharge and refuse to perform 
further, and use the breach as a defense. 
"The purchaser's right of electing to affirm or 
disaffirm the contract and to bring an appropriate 
action can be lost only by his own act or laches, 
but he must exercise such right within a reasonable 
time after discovery of the vendor's failure or re-
fusal to perform. In the absence of fraud or mis-
take, the purchaser cannot affirm the contract in 
part and rescind it in part. Where, subsequent to 
the execution of the contract, the vendor sells the 
realty to an innocent third person, the original 
purchaser can affirm his contract and sue for 
10 
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damages, or he can disaffirm the contract by way 
of rescission and sue to recover back what has been 
paid so as to be restored to the status quo at the 
time the contract was made. 
"Where there is an anticipatory breach of a realty 
contract, conditional on the vendor furnishing a 
good and marketable title, the vendee has a choice 
of two remedies, that is, to accept the breach as 
tendered and sue for damages, or to treat the con-
tract as continuing until the time stated for per-
formance and then sue for specific performance." 
(Emphasis added) 
POINT II 
THE FACT THAT INTERMOUNTAIN CAPI-
TAL CORPORATION PURCHASED THE 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION AT THE SHER-
IFF'S SALE IS OF NO SIGNIFICANCE IN 
DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE 
PARTIES HEREIN BECAUSE APPELLANTS 
HAD ALREADY ELECTED THEIR REMEDY 
AND DID NOT IN SUBSTANCE OR EFFECT 
ALTER THAT ELECTION SUBSEQUENT TO 
THE SALE. 
Appellants' argument that the purchase of the prop-
erty in question by Intermountain at the sheriff's sale 
reinstated Contract "B" is untenable. The fact of the 
matter is that at the time Appellants filed their Cross 
Claim against Intermountain in which they alleged antici-
patory breach of Contract "B," the Decree of Foreclosure 
in favor of the Plaintiff in the original foreclosure action 
had already been entered; the court had already ordered 
the sale of the property in question; (R. 76) and Inter-
mountain had already purchased the property in ques-
tion at the sheriff's sale. (R. 83) 
I I 
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In other words, Appellants waited until 12 days after 
Intermountain had purchased the property in question at 
the sheriff's sale before they filed their Cross Claim in 
which they asked only for money damages as above enum-
erated and said nothing therein about claiming any inter-
est in the property and did not question Intermountain's 
purchase at the sheriff's sale. No claim was made that the 
purchase by Intermountain had the effect of reinstating 
the contract or reinstating any interest Appellants might 
have had. Nearly six years later in 1974, Appellants filed 
an Amended Cross Claim against Intermountain in which 
they, again, prayed only for damages, this time in the 
amount of $350,000.00, plus $14,000.00 in attorneys fees. 
(R. 131) 
Appellants made some attempt in their Third-Party 
Complaint against Respondent to raise the issue that by 
purchasing at the sheriff's sale Intermountain reinstated 
Appellants' interest in the property in question. (R. 98) 
However, the prayer of that Third-Party Complaint is 
wholly inconsistent with the remedy elected previously, 
as well as with the damages sought in Appellants' Cross 
Claim and Amended Cross Claim against Intermountain. 
It appears as though Appellants in their Third-Party Com-
plaint against Respondent were seeking to have the court 
award both damages for breach of contract, as well as 
order performance of the contract, which, as discussed 
above, the court cannot do. 
Appellants have cited the case of Tanner v. Lawler, 
6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882 (1957), affd on rehearing, 6 
Utah 268,311P.2d79K1957),asauthority insupport of 
12 
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their argument that the purchase by Intermountain at the 
sheriff's sale reinstated Appellants' interest in the property. 
The fact that Appellants did not hold a judgment lien 
against the property and the fact that Appellants had al-
ready elected to sue for damages under a theory of antici-
patory breach of contract makes ineffective and pointless 
Appellants' use of the Tanner case as authority in the case 
at bar. Furthermore, this Court merely observed in the 
Tanner case that // Reichert had redeemed from the sher-
iff's sale as a judgment debtor, subsequent liens and other 
interests in the property would have been restored. In our 
case we are not concerned with the effect of a redemption 
by a judgment debtor. No redemption is here involved in 
any form except to note that Appellants failed to redeem 
the property within the statutory period. 
Appellants argue in their brief before this Court that 
in order for them to have redeemed from Intermountain, 
they would have been required to pay the amount owed 
by Intermountain to the Harveys, plus interest, costs and 
attorneys fees, plus the entire amount due from the Appel-
lants to Intermountain under Contract "B," even though 
that amount was not yet payable and even though that 
amount was in dispue. However, Rule 69(f)(3), U.R.C.P., 
provides an orderly procedure to resolve disagreements or 
disputes over the proper amount necessary to be paid for 
redemption: 
"In the event there is a disagreement as to whether 
any sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or 
proper, the person seeking redemption may pay 
the amount necessary for redemption, less the 
amount in dispute, to the court out of which execu-
tion or order authorizing the sale was issued, and 
13 
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at the same time file with the court a petition 
setting forth the item or items demanded to which 
he objects, together with his grounds of objection; 
and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing 
a time for hearing of such objections." 
By following the procedure outlined in Rule 69(f)(3), 
Appellants could have had their day in court with regard 
to any disputed amount. 
It was the Appellants' obligation to pay the amount 
owing to Intermountain under Contract "B." Such pay-
ment would have been more than sufficient to have paid 
the Harveys who initiated the foreclosure action on Con-
tract "A." 
By arguing that the purchase of the property in ques-
tion by Intermountain at the sheriff's sale had the effect 
of reinstating an interest of Appellants in the property, 
Appellants have clouded and confused the real issue in 
this case and have thereby attempted to cure any defects 
growing out of their election of remedies almost six years 
ago. Appellants have argued, for example, that they stood 
in the position of a second mortgagee or a judgment 
creditor. It is hard to conceive that such could be the case 
where Appellants were actually the mortgagors under 
Contract " B " and were the ones whose default in pay-
ments resulted in the initial foreclosure action. 
In view of the course followed by Appellants in pur-
suing any remedy they might have against Intermountain 
as evidenced by the record of prior proceedings now be-
fore this Court, Appellants' argument and cases in support 
14 
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thereof that Intermountain's purchase at the sheriff's sale 
reinstated Appellants' interest in the property is without 
foundaion. The cases cited by Appellants in support of this 
argument clearly do not concern situations similar to this 
case and can in no wise be applied on the basis of law or 
facts. 
Equally moot for the same reasons are Appellants' 
arguments that Respondent took title to the property sub-
ject to the rights of all parties with recorded interests; that 
the recorded Lis Pendens and recorded Contract " B " gave 
notice to Horman of Appellants' interest and that Appel-
lants should have been allowed to amend their Complaint 
to allege actual notice to Respondent of Appellants' inter-
est. 
It is interesting to note that Appellants have cited 
cases involving the effect of a foreclosure sale upon the 
interests of junior lien holders while Appellants them-
selves have asserted no lien against the property in ques-
tion. Appellants have not proceeded in any manner to 
assert or preserve a claim of lien on the property but have 
consistently claimed and prayed for monetary damages 
and sought relief on the theory of anticipatory breach of 
contract. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT HAD BEFORE IT AND 
CONSIDERED ALL OF THE PRIOR PRO-
CEEDINGS CONCERNING THE PROPERTY 
IN QUESTION AND IT WAS NOT ERROR 
TO TREAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND TO GRANT THE SAME. 
15 
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Appellants have already cited Rule 12(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted shall be treated as one for summary judg-
ment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 if "matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded 
by the court/ ' The rules further provide in such a situation 
that all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present further material made pertinent to such a motion 
by Rule 56. Appellants misconstrue the Rule, however, 
when they argue that neither party in the case at bar pre-
sented any matters outside the pleadings. It may be true 
that at the time the court made its determination to treat 
the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, 
there were no depositions, answers to interrogatories, ad-
missions or affidavits on file; but the phrase "matters out-
side the pleadings" embraces much more than depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. Sec-
tion 15, Summary Judgment, 73 AM. JUR. 2d, states the 
lav/ as follows: 
". . . Since the effect of the presentation and con-
sideration of 'matters outside the pleadings' on a 
motion to dismiss under federal Rule 12(b), or on 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings under 
Rule 12(c), is to convert such motion into one for 
summary judgment under Rule 56, it has been held 
that the matters so presented must meet the require-
ments of Rule 56, and be in the form of deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on 
file, or affidavits. In particular cases, however, 
'matters outside the pleadings' (other than, but 
frequently together with, affidavits) which have 
been sanctioned to convert a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6) or (c) into a motion for a summary judg-
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ment, include not only depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, and admissions, but also oral testi-
mony, exhibits, documents, and records from prior 
proceedings, stipulations or agreed statements of 
fact, alleged defamatory matter in a libel action, a 
collective bargaining agreement, and miscellaneous 
other items such as copyright registration certifi-
cates, certified copies of National Guard orders, 
and correspondence.'' (Emphasis added) 
A recent annotation in 2 ALR Fed. 1027 cites num-
erous cases in which the courts, without specific discussion, 
have sanctioned conversion of a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6) or for judgment on the pleadings under 
Rule 12(c) into one for summary judgment where the 
"matters outside the pleadings" which were presented to 
the court in connection with, or in support of, such motion 
consisted of one or more of the following: depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, admissions, oral testimony, ex-
hibits, documents and records from prior actions or pro-
ceedings involving one or more of the parties, stipulations 
or statements of fact by the parties or documents sub-
mitted by agreement, alleged defamatory matter in a libel 
action, collective bargaining agreement between the 
parties, miscellaneous other matters as indicated paren-
thetically following case citations in the annotation. 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is, 
for all intents and purposes, identical to the Federal Rule 
12(b). Cases interpreting the Federal rule should accord-
ingly be given consideration in interpreting the Utah rule. 
The record before the lower court, which is essentially 
the same record before this Court, includes the record of 
prior proceedings involving the Appellants which, in the 
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case at bar, becomes particularly significant to the extent 
that those proceedings reveal the election and position 
taken by Appellants as hereinbefore discussed. The Re-
spondent did not become involved in the proceedings con-
cerning the property in question until February 1974. The 
original Complaint in which Appellants were named as 
Defendants, however, was filed in March of 1968, nearly 
six years before. During the first part of this six year 
period, considerable activity occurred, which is apparent 
from the record. For a considerable period of time, there-
after during which Respondent purchased the property 
for a valuable consideration, there was no activity in the 
case. 
As has been previously discussed herein, Appellants 
took the position early in the prior proceedings, and main-
tained that position to the present, that Intermountain, 
the party from which Respondent derived its interest in 
the property in question, had committed anticipatory 
breach of the contract known as Contract " B " for which 
Appellants elected to seek damages without asserting any 
interest in the property or lien thereon. By such an elec-
tion, Appellants no longer have the option of suing for 
specific performance or insisting that the deed to Re-
spondents be declared void. 
It became evident to the lower court upon reviewing 
the prior proceedings involving Appellants that Appel-
lants had elected to sue for money damages on the basis 
of an alleged anticipatory breach and upon so doing gave 
up all claim of interest in the property in question. There 
was nothing left for the lower court to do in that instance 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
except to treat the Motion to Dismiss as one for summary 
judgment and give the parties opportunity to present 
additional evidence, which the court did. 
The "matters outside the pleadings" which are re-
quired by Rule 12(b) before a motion to dismiss can be 
converted to a motion for summary judgment, which were 
considered by the lower court before it converted the 
Motion to Dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, 
included all of the exhibits, documents and record of prior 
proceedings involving Appellants before Respondent came 
into the picture in 1974. In other words, the bare "plead-
ings" between Appellants and Respondent, as far as Re-
spondent is concerned, consist only of the Third-Party 
Complaint and those pleadings specifically naming Re-
spondent. All other matters in the record before the lower 
court were matters "outside" those pleadings. 
The case of Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., 25 U.2d 121, 
477 P.2d 150 (1970), cited by Appellants, clearly does not 
apply to our present situation. In that case the lower court 
apparently gave the plaintiff 30 days within which to 
produce evidence to support her allegations of actual 
malice in a suit for libel, after which the court granted 
summary judgment. This Court properly reversed the 
lower court's decision in that case and in so doing ob-
served that "summary judgment is never used to determine 
what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are 
any material issues of fact in dispute." In the case now 
before this Court, the lower court had before it the record 
of prior proceedings spanning a period of almost six years 
which disclosed the position of Appellants, such that it 
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became obvious to the lower court that Appellants had 
in fact failed to claim an interest in the property in ques-
tion and had likewise failed to assert any lien against said 
property and that there were no material issues of fact in 
dispute between Appellants and Respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the summary judgment 
granted by the lower court for the reason that the lower 
court carefully observed the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure throughout the entire proceedings and converted 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss to a motion for summary 
judgment only after considering all "matters outside the 
pleadings" as contained in the record of prior proceed-
ings involving Appellants, which record showed that Ap-
pellants had elected to sue for damages on the basis of 
anticipatory breach of contract, by and through which 
election they gave up any claim of interest in the subject 
property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Randall L. Romrell 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN 
AND HENRIOD 
Attorneys for Respondent 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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